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“Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an 
eternity, üere this system was struck out. Much labour lost: Many 
fruitless trials made: And a slow, but continued improvement carried out 
during infinite ages in the art of world-making.– 
David Hume (1779) 
 
 
 
1 Abstract and Introduction 
 
 
For Lee Smolin [54-58], our universe is only one in a much larger cosmos (the 
Multiverse) è a member of a growing community of universes, each one being 
born in a bounce following the formation of a black hole. In the course of this, the 
values of the free parameters of the physical laws are reprocessed and slightly 
changed. This leads to an evolutionary picture of the Multiverse, where universes 
with more black holes have more descendants. Smolin concludes, that due to this 
kind of Cosmological Natural Selection our own universe is the way it is. The 
hospitality for life of our universe is seen as an offshot of this self-organized 
process. 
This paper outlines Smolinüs hypothesis, its strength, weakness and limits, and 
comments on the hypothesis from different points of view: physics, biology, 
philosophy of science, philosophy of nature, and metaphysics. 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
This paper is the extended version of a contribution to the MicroCosmos è MacroCosmos 
conference in Aachen, Germany, September 2-5 1998. It was finished in late 1998 and published in 
the conference proceedings (http://www.vijlen.com/vip-projects/confs/mima/Vaas/VAAS.html) 
 2  Explananda and conjectures 
 
 
2.1 Crucial questions 
 
· Why do the about 20 free parameters of the standard model of elementary par-
ticle physics è and also some important cosmological parameters (expansion rate, 
deceleration parameter, mean mass density, cosmological constant, inflation 
charge, kind and percentage of nonbaryonic matter etc.) è have the values they 
actually have? 
· Why are the parameters “fine-tuned– for (earth-like) life? 
 
 
2.2 Some proposals for an answer 
 
The universe is the way it is 
· due to a result of pure chance, and there is no possibility and no need for an 
explanation at all, 
· due to a result of pure chance, because every set of parameters is realized some-
where in a cosmos (Multiverse) of many universes; we happen to live in a 
universe which must be hospitable for (earth-like) life due to the parameters, 
which are a necessary conditions for such forms of life, because otherwise we 
could not observe these physical properties and ask this question (Weak Anthropic 
Principle), 
· because otherwise we would not exist (Strong Anthropic Principle), 
· because there is a final Theory of Everything which necessitates exactly these 
values of the parameters, i.e. there are, as a matter of fact or logic, no other values 
possible è hence, there are no “free– parameters at all, 
· because our universe was designed to have these very values (Cosmological 
Argument from Design), 
· because the values of the parameters were a product of a Cosmological Natural 
Selection, i.e. the result of a self-organized process.  
The last kind of answer is Smolinüs account. 
 
 
2.3 Universes within the Multiverse  
 
There are different meanings of the term “universe– [33, p. 277], for example:  
· Everything (physically) in Existence, ever, anywhere, 
· the region we inhabit plus everything that has interacted or ever will interact 
with this region, 
· this region plus everything that has interacted with it by now, or will at least do 
so in the next few billion years, 
· any gigantic system of causally interacting things that is wholly (or very to a very 
large extent) isolated from others, 
 · any system that might well have become gigantic, etc., even if it does in fact 
recollapse while it is still very small. 
Nowadays, the term “cosmos– or “Multiverse– might be used to refer to Every-
thing in Existence, while “universe– is used (and will be used here) in a way per-
mitting talk of several universes within the Multiverse. In principle, these uni-
verses might or might not be spatially, temporally and/or dimensionally separated 
from each other. 
 
 
2.4 Cosmological Natural Selection  
 
2.4.1 The argument 
 
Smolinüs hypothesis depends on the following argument: 
If a new universe is born from the center of a black hole, i.e. if the bounce of a 
singularity leads to a new expanding region of spacetime, 
and if the values of the fundamental free parameters of physical theories can 
change thereby in a small and random way, i.e. differ from those in the region in 
which the black hole formed (in particular, Smolin has in mind the dimensionless 
parameters of the standard model of particle physics),  
then this results in different reproduction rates of the physically different 
universes. 
Hence, our universe has been selected for a maximum number of black holes. It is 
a descendant of a series of universes, each of which had itself been selected for the 
same criterion.  
Thus, the values of the parameters are the way they actually are, because this set of 
values leads to a (local) maximum of descendant universes. 
 
2.4.2 Premises 
 
This line of reasoning depends on the following premises: 
· The gravitational collapse of matter (and, especially, of the core of an exploding 
star) does not end in a deadlock singularity inside a black hole but gives birth to 
an offspring universe. 
· While the form of the laws of physics remains the same, there are small and ran-
dom changes of the values of the lawsü  parameters during the bounce which leads 
to the origin of a new universe with slightly different fundamental properties.  
These premises of an evolution of universes and changes of physical constants and 
laws are not entirely new [cf. e.g. 35; 47, ch. 44; 76, p. 239 ff]. The possibility of a 
bounce, although speculative, has been even discussed recently in several different 
approaches to quantum gravity, including string theory [20; 31; 42]. The novelty 
of Smolinüs approach is the introduction of small changes of the parametersü  
values and his application of Darwinism to cosmology. (Radical changes are not 
very interesting because in those universes which differ substantially from our 
own, stars like ours could not form è the conditions for star formation are rather 
special). 
 
 2.4.3 Auxiliary assumption 
 
There is also an important auxiliary assumption: 
· Our universe is typical, i.e. nearly optimal for black hole formation. 
 
2.4.4 Implications: the evolution of universes 
  
Now, the implications are: 
· Given the premises, it is probable that a universe chosen at random of a given 
collection of physically possible universes has parameters that are near a peak 
(local extremum) of the formation of black holes after a sufficient time (or, if we 
canüt or wonüt define a multiversal i.e. trans-universal time: after a sufficient num-
ber of generations).  
· Given also the auxiliary assumption, i.e. if our universe is a typical member of 
that collection of physically possible universes, then its fundamental parameters 
must be close to one of the peaks of the formation of black holes. 
· Thus, most changes in the values of the parameters of the physical laws would 
decrease the rate at which black holes are produced in our universe. That is, most 
universes with (even only slightly) different constants of nature compared to our 
own universe would contain less black holes. è This conclusion is testable accor-
ding to Smolin. And he actually suggested some ways how to test it (see below).  
· Thus, Smolinüs answer to the question regarding the values of the physical para-
meters is simply this: The parameters have the values we observe, because these 
make the formation of black holes much more likely than most other values.  
· Hence, according to Smolin our universe is a product of mutation and selection 
analogous to the evolution of species described first by Charles Darwin in his 
seminal book “On the Origin of Species" in 1859 [12] and independently also by 
Alfred Russel Wallace [cf. 74]. 
 
 
 
3 Science 
 
 
3.1  Physics and cosmology 
 
3.1.1  Which parameters? 
 
Of course it is not known if we are varying the right parameters to test Smolinüs 
hypothesis. It is unclear, how many free parameters there are, whether their varia-
tion is random etc.  
But these open questions are no objections. As long as there is no better tool at 
hand, everything we have should be tried. And with increasing knowledge about 
the fundamental parameters the hypothesis of Cosmological Natural Selection 
could be improved. 
  
 3.1.2 Refutation by a Theory of Everything? 
 
Smolinüs hypothesis is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that there is a funda-
mental physical theory. Thus, the possibility of the discovery of such a Theory of 
Everything is no objection but would be another and perhaps an even better oppor-
tunity to test his hypothesis. 
However, Smolinüs hypothesis is inconsistent with the idea that a fundamental 
theory could uniquely determine the observed parameters of the standard model of 
particle physics and cosmology. If it could be shown that the values of the parame-
ters must be the way they are as a matter of fact or logic, there still could be a 
Multiverse consisting of indefinitely many universes (with the same laws and 
parameters like ours) but no natural selection of these universes, hence no 
cosmological Darwinian evolution. 
 
3.1.3  Open questions regarding new universes born from black holes  
 
Even if black holes are places of birth for universes it is not clear  
· whether the values of the physical parameters really varies by small amounts and 
randomly as it is presumed, 
· what happens to the already born universes if their mother black holes merge 
together or evaporate due to quantum mechanical events (Hawking radiation),  
· whether there are further universes created if black holes merge together è and 
how many: one or two? 
· why there is only one offspring from a black hole and not (infinitely) many,  
· and, if the latter is true, whether the numbers of new universes which are born 
from each black hole may differ according to the mass of the black hole. (Claude 
Barrabe s and Valerie Frolov [2] have suggested that a large number of universes 
might be created inside each black hole and that the number of universes produced 
that way may grow as the mass of the black hole increases. If so, universes should 
be selected for supermassive black holes, not for sheer numbers of black holes.) 
It is also not clear whether the different universes interact which each other [cf. 8; 
9]. There is even the threat of a reciprocal destruction. 
Another restriction of Smolinüs approach is that his cosmic reprocessing mecha-
nism only leads to different values of parameters, but not to different laws. His 
hypothesis still requires the same basic structure of the laws in all the universes in 
order to make sense. But of course an even more radical proposal è a variation not 
only of universal constants but also of universal laws è is beyond every possibility 
of scientific investigation (at least for now). Furthermore, we simply do not know 
if and where a distinction is useful between universes which are physically 
possible, as opposed to those that can only be imagined (which are only 
conceivable or logically possible). 
 
3.1.4 Predictability and Testability 
 
See below (5.3). 
 
 
 3.2  The status of life 
 
3.2.1 There is no necessary connection between black holes and life  
 
In principle, life and Cosmological Natural Selection could be independent of 
each other. There are two reasons for this: 
· On the one hand there may be universes full of black holes were life as we know 
it couldnüt evolve. For example it might be possible that there are only short-lived 
giant stars which collapse quickly into black holes, or that there are universes 
dominated either by helium or by neutrons (corresponding to the neutron/proton 
mass difference being either zero or negative), or that there are universes with 
many (more) primordial black holes [27; 36; 78-80] and maybe without stars at 
all. Such universes might be very reproductive because of their giant stars or 
primordial black holes but are not able to produce earth-like life. 
· On the other hand we can conceive a universe without black holes at all (if 
supernovae lead to neutron stars only, or if there are not stars above a critical mass 
limit) but which could be rich in earth-like life nevertheless.  
Thus, there is not a (logically) necessary connection between black holes and life 
[cf. 18; 49]. 
Smolinüs hypothesis of Cosmological Natural Selection therefore cannot necessa-
rily explain the presumed fine-tuning of the universe for life. By the way, Smolin 
[57, p. 393] also stressed that both properties of our universe è containing life and 
producing a maximum number of black holes è must be taken as independent for 
the purpose of testing the theory. 
 
3.2.2 Nevertheless there may be a contingent connection 
 
Namely via the role of carbon [57; 58] 
· as the “molecule of life–, because of its ability to make complex molecules (to a 
much larger extent than any other element), 
· as an element accelerating star formation, because of the role that carbon 
monoxide plays in shielding and cooling the giant molecular clouds of gas and 
dust were stars are born. 
Thus, there may be at least a coincidence between the conditions for maximizing 
black hole formation and being hospitable for life. If Smolin is right, then this 
could even be a physically necessary connection. But we must still wonder why 
the laws of nature are such that this linkage occurs. (And it is not clear, whether 
carbon monoxide really does increase the number of black holes, because 
hydrogen cools efficiently too, and all the stars in the early universe were carbon-
free [52].) 
 
3.2.3 Anthropic considerations 
 
According to the so-called Anthropic Principle [see 1; 3; 4] the following is true: 
“what we can expect to observe must be restricted by the conditions necessary for 
our presence as observers– [7, p. 291] resp. “We see the universe the way it is 
 because we exist– resp. “... because if it were different, we would not be here to 
observe it– [27, p. 124, 183].  
To give a causal explanation for the fine-tuned parameters (given that life is 
actually restricted to some special conditions [cf. 62]),  
· there must be either a final theory to necessitate this fine-tuning (or, if one 
wishes to avoid a Platonic interpretation, the fundamental properties of nature are 
as a matter of fact in accordance with a quite high probability of the existence of 
life, i.e. the view that the properties of our universe are enormously improbable is 
mistaken è hence, strictly speaking there is no fine-tuning at all), 
· or there must be a selection effect at work, which could consist in an Observa-
tional Selection due to the existence of many different universes, or it could 
consist even in a Cosmological Natural Selection of universes which are 
hospitable for life.  
Thus, if it could be shown that a maximum of black hole formation rate is indeed 
correlated with (or followed by) a hospitality for life, Smolinüs hypothesis would 
indeed causally explain the fine-tuning. (Note that Cosmological Natural Selection 
implies Observational Selection but not vice versa.)  
 
3.2.4 Life and Intelligence as an epiphenomenon 
 
If they do not contribute to black hole formation, life and intelligence are a mere 
byproduct or epiphenomenon in Smolinüs scenario, i.e. they are causally inert 
(regarding the evolution of the universes). Thus, our universe was not positively 
selected for life, even if the conditions of life would be exactly the same as the 
conditions for maximizing the numbers of black holes. Therefore, Cosmological 
Natural Selection does not imply (or entail) a “meaning– or function or advantage 
of life.  
 
3.2.5 Science-fiction: making other universes 
 
But couldnüt it be possible, that, nonetheless, there is a hidden connection between 
the hospitality of universes for life on the one hand and black hole formation on 
the other? Perhaps black holes could be advantageous for life, or life could be 
advantageous for black hole formation. 
For instance, successful industrial civilizations will eventually create black holes 
as waste disposals, weapons, accelerators and research tools [68]. Or they need 
small and therefore hot black holes for energy production and as heaters to keep 
warm and alive in a forever expanding, decaying universe which runs out of free 
energy [11]. In principle, black holes could provide a permanent solution to this 
problem, since they convert matter into energy with perfect efficiency via the 
Hawking radiation. Thus, it is possible that life creates other universes as an 
unintentional by-product of advanced technologies. Furthermore, it was speculated 
that intelligent cosmic engineers could create universes by means of black holes 
[19; 20; 24]. Maybe they use the other universes as laboratories or as weird zoos. 
Or they need them as future homes, if their own universe starts to collapse or is 
burned out [13, pp. 149 f]. In that case, they also need traversable wormholes to 
change places [70; 73]. There would be no self-organized evolution in this case 
 but rather a preplanned development. Nevertheless, life could still be seen as a 
“tool– of the Multiverse to produce more universes. However, it would be no 
epiphenomenon in this case but like “medusids, and black holes/universes are the 
polyps of a single evolutionary process– [11, p. 5].  
Of course these suggestions are pure, speculative science-fiction at the moment è 
in line with Olaf Stapledonüs novel “Star Maker– [59]. Nevertheless, the specula-
tions could be verifiable in principle è if, for instance, a hidden message could be 
deciphered in the exact values of fundamental parameters or numbers like Pi [50, 
ch. 24] è a greeting card from some strange cosmic engineers who created our 
universe in their laboratory. 
 
 
 
4 Terminology 
 
 
4.1 The Darwinian analogy is an inadequate model transfer 
 
Smolinüs Darwinian analogy of Cosmological Natural Selection is in some respect 
misleading. It is useful to define Natural Selection with Smolin as the selective 
growth of a population on a fitness landscape with the landscapeüs altitude deter-
mining the rate of reproduction. But this is not sufficient, because natural selection 
as described in biology è there is a broad consensus among biologists here, [cf. 
e.g. 15, ch. 2; 16, ch. IV; 21, ch. 6, 7; 22, part III; 25; 34, ch. 2; 37; 44, part II; 45, 
p. 97; 46, ch. 11; 48, ch. 4; 77, ch. 7] è also depends on the assumption that the 
spread of populations (or genes) is crucially constrained by external factors 
(shortage of food, living space, mating opportunities etc.). The fitness landscape is 
shaped not only by internal restrictions, but also by external ones è there would be 
no adaptation without them. Resources are limited è this is a crucial premise of 
Darwinüs theory (already stressed by Thomas R. Malthus [38] who had an im-
portant influence on Darwinüs thinking, and, independently, also on Alfred Russel 
Wallace, the cofounder of Darwinism, [cf. 74]). In comparison with that, the fit-
ness of Smolinüs universes is constrained by only one factor è the numbers of 
black holes è, and this is an internal limitation. Although Smolinüs universes have 
different reproduction rates, they are not competing against each other [43]. 
Although there are “successful– (productive) and “less successful– universes, 
there is no “overpopulation– and no selective pressure or “struggle for life– resp. 
“struggle for existence– as Darwin has put it [12, p. 459, 490] (somewhat 
misleading, by the way, but he meant the term “in a large and metaphorical 
sense–). Hence, there is no natural selection in a strict biological (Darwinian) 
sense. Smolinüs universes are isolated from each other (except maybe for their 
umbilical cords). Therefore, there couldnüt be a quasi-biological evolution of uni-
verses.  
However, Smolin may still insist that competition has nothing essential to do with 
natural selection and could give arms races and symbioses of species as 
evolutionüs counter-examples. But these counter-examples are, contrary to 
 Cosmological Natural Selection and a broad consensus among biologists, also 
based on a (partially shared) common environment which is continuously 
interacting with the species in question. And ultimately, arms races as well as 
symbioses are also based on competition. For instance, arms races are struggles 
for resources, e.g. food or shelter, dominance or mating partners; and symbiosis è 
which can also be seen as reciprocal parasitism è is competition between the 
symbionts against other individuals of their species with less effective symbionts, 
or competition between different species which try to get the same resources, or 
even competition for protection mechanisms. By the way, there is nothing like an 
arms race or symbiosis between different universes. Thus, biological natural 
selection in general and Darwinian natural selection in particular crucially depends 
on external interactions and competition è and this is not just a matter of 
definition. 
In conclusion: “Cosmological Natural Selection– is a somewhat misleading term 
and an inadequate model transfer. But of course this does not prove Smolinüs 
hypothesis wrong. 
 
 
4.2 There is no life of the cosmos 
 
It is even more problematic to compare or equalize universes (or the Multiverse) 
with life [23] è an idea, by the way, that goes back at least to Plato (4th century 
BC), cf. his “Timaios– 92 b.  
If we take life as a self-organized, nonequilibrium system governed by a symbolic 
program (like the genetic code [64]), which can reproduce both itself and its pro-
gram, as Smolin does [57, p. 194], Smolinüs universes may fit into this definition 
of life, although he does not “see that it is useful– [personal communication] and 
does not want to stretch the analogy to this extreme [57, p. 195]. But if one applies 
his definition of life to our universe, one might indeed be forced to conceptualize 
it as alive. For, if Smolin is right, self-reproduction and some sort of a self-
organized non-equilibrium seem to be properties of our universe (expanding or 
contracting universes are not in equilibrium, and they are also not perfectly closed 
systems due to their relationships with other universes). If we take the parameters 
and laws of nature as a program which is stored symbolically (i.e. which is 
realized or represented by physical events), all three premises of Smolinüs 
definition of life cited above are satisfied for the universe. 
However, Smolin does not want to regard the laws of nature as a program because 
“there is no sense in which the laws of nature could be represented symbolically, 
as something analogous to a computer program– [57, p. 195]. But this is not the 
point. Biological life does not care if computer programs or whatever can 
represent the genetic code symbolically. It is even misleading to treat the genetic 
code as real (as objective information sui generis) è it is our abstract description 
and, in fact, simplification of the complex causal interrelationships of the 
biochemical processes within a cell which we call transcription and translation 
[64, p. 44 f]. Likewise, we need not conceptualize natureüs parameters and laws as 
a program in the strict sense. If we do not want to give them a Platonic or a purely 
instrumentalistic (anti-realistic) status, we can think of them as abstract 
 descriptions, as our hypotheses of observed regularities which are a result of 
specific mind-independent properties of nature è a view which seems to be 
compatible with Smolinüs relational picture of the cosmos.  
To avoid the view that the universe is alive, Smolinüs definition of life has to be 
extended. And there is something missing indeed: interaction with an 
environment. Life as we know it is in a permanent exchange with its surroundings. 
This is not true for Smolinüs universes. Here, there are only single one-way effects 
(births), nothing more è no interactions in either way. This difference is already 
sufficient not to think of our universe as a living system.  
Furthermore, life, as we know it, depends both on living and nonliving entities to 
interact with. This is also not true for Smolinüs universes. Here by his own 
definition, only (living or non-living?) universes are surrounding our universe. 
Hence, the metaphor of a living cosmos is a mixture of opposite terms.  
Finally, if it is already strange to conceptualize living universes, why should we 
even conceive the whole cosmos (Multiverse) as a living one? It is by definition 
not in an exchange with an environment, and it is by definition not an offspring of 
reproduction. 
In conclusion: Neither our universe nor the Multiverse is alive if “alive– is under-
stood in terms of ordinary language and biology. 
But of course this terminological criticism is no objection to Smolinüs basic ideas. 
 
 
 
5 Philosophy of Science and Nature 
 
 
5.1 Advantages and Consequences 
 
5.1.1 A truly Perfect Cosmological Principle and the ultimate expulsion 
 
Suppose, Smolin is right. The implications for our view of nature would be enor-
mous. Our universe would be only a grain of sand on the incredible large beach of 
the Multiverse. And it would be in no way special.  
According to the Cosmological Principle, our universe is homogeneous and 
isotropic on the large scale, that is, it appears the same at all places and, from any 
one place, looks the same in all directions. If Smolin is right, we could accept a 
truly Perfect Cosmological Principle, that is, the Multiverse is literally “full– of 
universes like our own universe.   
It has often been said that the Copernican revolution has catapulted the earth and 
hence, mankind, out of the center of the universe. In the twentieth century it beca-
me clear that neither the earth, nor the sun, nor the milky way, nor the local su-
percluster of galaxies are at the center of the universe, because there is no center at 
all. Nor does the baryonic matter of which we consist dominate the universe, i.e. 
in comparison with the assumed particles of dark matter even the material we are 
made of is quantitatively negligible. This dramatic widening of our horizon and 
diminution of our role in the universe led to a radical cosmic expulsion. Our posi-
 tion in space-time is completely irrelevant, providing no evidence for a universal 
meaning or a cosmic value of mankind, nor a protection against contingency and 
absurdity [67]. In recent decades, some interpretations of the Anthropic Principle 
and the alleged fine-tuning of the physical parameters have been examples for a 
tendency to reverse this development. But the idea of the Multiverse made out of 
many different universes, which implies an Observational Selection effect, is once 
again sufficient to wipe out any romantic dreams of anthropocentrism. But in 
these picture at least our life-bearing universe might still be special. In Smolinüs 
account however, our universe has most properties in common with all other 
universes. It would be a very ordinary world indeed. Thus, if Smolin is right, there 
is no reason to believe that (human) life is unique or that the constants of nature 
have a singular status.  
 
5.1.2 Advantages of Smolins hypothesis 
 
Given the fact that there is no fundamental theory which necessitates the values of 
the fundamental parameters, Smolinüs hypothesis is the only one around which is 
able to give a causal explanation of them è in opposition to non-scientific teleolo-
gical speculations on the one hand and the claim of pure accident or a lucky 
chance on the other, which are not falsifiable resp. verifiable in principle and 
hence not scientific at all.  
Furthermore, Smolinüs hypothesis is not a vague, bold claim but at least roughly 
based on a solid theoretical framework (General Theory of Relativity, Quantum 
field theory) and on empirical constraints. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, 
Smolinüs premises are quite speculative. And he himself admits that “what I am 
presenting ... is a frank speculation, if you will, a fantasy– [57, p. 7]. 
 
 
5.2 The View from Nowhere 
 
Smolin claims that “the desire to be able to see the universe from the outside, as a 
disembodied observer ... is a remnant of the old physics and is inconsistent with 
relativity and quantum theory–; he propagates a view which describes “the 
universe as a coherent whole, in relationship only to itself, without need of 
anything outside itself to give it law, meaning or order– [57, p. 22]. He sees his 
hypothesis as “a new approach to the weaving of an objective view of the universe 
that, by its very construction, denies the possibility of its being read as the view of 
an observer outside the world– and postulates “the principle of the logical 
exclusion of the possibility of an interpretation of cosmological theory in terms of 
an observer outside of the worldé [57, p. 251 and 334 resp.]. 
Smolin is certainly right that there is (for us) no God-like view from Nowhere 
down at the universe or Multiverse. However, the picture he himself gives us is 
also a view from “above–. It is, in that respect, not different from other relativistic 
models. Speculations about the values of the physical parameters and the repro-
duction of other universes must describe these parameters and universes “from the 
outside– as long as we cannot avoid spatial descriptions at all. But this should be 
no problem ਂ  contrary to what Smolin might think. It is an abstraction or a 
 metaphor which does not make his hypothesis right or wrong. It is still compatible 
with a relational view for which Smolin is arguing. 
Smolin has, by the way, admitted [in personal communication] that he has not yet 
been able to formulate Cosmological Natural Selection in a language which fully 
satisfies his principle cited above. But perhaps a Quantum Theory of Gravity will 
provide such a language some day. There has been made in fact some progress in 
formulating an alternative to the Lorentzian space-time: the theory of causal sets 
[39-41]. Here, events in a discrete space-time, partially ordered by causal relations 
down to the Planck scale, can be defined prior to a space-time manifold which 
therefore appears as a classical limit only and might be described from an internal, 
finite-time point of view. 
 
 
5.3 Predictability and Testability 
 
According to Smolin, there are eight known variations in the values of 
fundamental parameters that lead to worlds with fewer black holes than our own, 
but there is no variation known with has clearly the opposite effect. This is already 
an interesting observation. Furthermore, Smolinüs hypothesis has some predictive 
power, because there are physical effects and properties influencing black hole 
formation rates which are still not known (at least not precisely enough). Here, 
Smolinüs hypothesis provides some constraints for these effects, if the number of 
black holes is almost maximized. These predictions can be tested in principle and 
partly even in the near future.  
· The mass range of neutron stars provides the probably easiest test at the moment. 
If the mass of the K- meson (and hence the mass of the strange quark) is lower 
than a critical value, neutron stars could be made out of protons, neutrons and K- 
mesons inside, as Hans A. Bethe and Gerald E. Brown have suggested [5; 6], and 
not only out of neutrons as it is commonly thought (the electrons would turn to K- 
mesons and neutrinos instead of reacting with protons to neutrons and antineu-
trinos). If this is true, the upper mass limit of neutron stars is only about 1.5 solar 
masses. If the strange quark mass is higher than the critical value, neutron stars are 
made mostly out of neutrons as it is currently thought and could obtain masses up 
to, say, 2.5 solar masses. Because in this case the number of black holes in our 
universe would be at least ten times lower (more stars would collapse into neutron 
stars, not black holes), a high strange quark mass could be an indication that Smo-
linüs hypothesis is wrong. (Note that this argument is independent of any Observa-
tional Selection effects associated with Anthropic reasoning, because the value of 
the strange quark mass may be varied within a large range before it produces a si-
gnificant effect on chemistry.) Until yet it is not known if there are neutron stars 
with more than 1.5 solar masses. But if there are some, they could be easily 
detected (the mass of a neutron star can be measured very accurately if it is one of 
a pair of neutron stars in orbit around each other). 
· On the other hand, if Smolin is right it should not be possible to further lower 
the upper mass limit of the strange quark below its actual value without somehow 
disrupting the process of star formation, because otherwise lower masses would 
imply an even higher black hole formation rate. However, such competing effects 
 are still unknown and can only be determined by detailed calculations in nuclear 
physics. 
· Other è much more crude è predictions are concerned with the variations of 
parameters like the mass of the electron, the strength of the weak interaction, the 
density of protons and neutrons, the duration of the presumed inflationary epoch 
of the early universe and so on.  
· More difficult is this: There are some changes of a parameter which leads to 
different effects regarding the numbers of black holes produced (some effects in-
crease the number of black holes while others decrease it). At the moment it is 
difficult to predict the overall outcome, given the complexity of the interrelations 
between these effects. Further studies will give a clearer picture. If it turns out that 
changes of these parameters decrease the number of black holes, Smolinüs hypo-
thesis will get into trouble. For instance an increase of the gravitational constant 
would decrease the mass of each star. Hence, more stars would be made out of the 
same given amount of mass. The result would be more black holes if everything 
else were the same. But it is not true that everything else stays the same in this 
case. Increasing the gravitational constant effects the formation of galaxies, the 
transfer of energy within stars, the evolution of stars, the amount of matter 
returned to the interstellar medium, the formation and lifetime of new stars and so 
on. And it is very difficult to predict the overall effect.  
· There could be quite different universes with even more black holes, e.g. 
because of small primordial black holes due to compressions during an early phase 
transition at the beginning of the universe [52]. If there had been many more 
primordial black holes within the early universe which have already evaporated 
due to quantum-mechanical processes, they would still leave an imprint in the 
cosmic microwave background (and perhaps also in the gamma range). Given the 
accuracy expected for CMB observations from satellites starting within the next 
decade, there is a realistic possibility that observations will distinguish between 
different (but until yet not convincingly established) theoretical models of the 
early universe and its formation rate of primordial black holes.  
· A faster star evolution or a different mechanism of early star formation could 
also refute Smolinüs hypothesis. For example, in a world without stable nuclear 
bound states many more massive collapsed objects would become black holes 
than in our universe, where the collapse is delayed by stellar nucleosynthesis. On 
the other hand, catalytic effects of heavy elements are leading to a strong positive 
feedback in massive star formation (via cooling mechanisms of carbon monoxide) 
from the initial rate of massive star formation without heavy elements. The 
question is then, whether a combination of observational and theoretical progress 
could disentangle the opposite effects. If it turns out that the number of black 
holes formed is greater in a world without nuclear bound states than in our 
universe, then Smolinüs hypothesis is in trouble. 
· Cosmological Natural Selection requires only a fine-tuning of some parameters 
within a certain range in accordance to maximize black hole formation rates. 
There is no need for an even finer tuning as it might be necessary for a Theory of 
Everything. For example, the density parameter W (the quotient of the universeüs 
mean mass density and its critical mass density), the cosmological constant L [see 
63; 65] and the neutrino masses [see 61; 71] are near a certain value which is criti-
 cal for a universe hospitable for earth-like life, but they need not have an exact 
value like L º 0, W º 1 etc. 
· There are proposals of alternative theories, for example regarding a black holeüs 
ability to create new universes, which are not consistent with Smolinüs hypothesis 
[2]. 
In conclusion, Smolinüs hypothesis makes some interesting and in principle 
testable predictions. They are at home in the reign of current cosmology and 
particle physics. Thus, Smolinüs account is of scientific interest. It is not merely 
another myth of origin or a just-so story! However... 
 
 
5.4 Smolinüs central claim cannot be falsified 
 
Falsifiability of a hypothesis depends on holding fixed the auxiliary assumptions 
needed to produce the targeted conclusion. In practice, one tries to show that the 
auxiliaries are themselves well confirmed or otherwise scientifically entrenched.  
What should be falsifiable according to Smolin is his claim that our universe is 
nearly optimal for black hole formation. However, this is not a necessary conse-
quence of his premises. A consequence is only that most universes are nearly opti-
mal. To move from this statistical conclusion to the targeted conclusion about our 
universe, Smolin [57, p. 127] simply assumes that our universe is typical (see 
2.4.3). This is an additional hypothesis as he admits. But this auxiliary assumption 
is neither confirmed nor otherwise scientifically entrenched! Thus, if changes in 
the values of our parameters did not lead to a lower rate of black hole formation è 
contrary to Smolinüs prediction è we could always “save– Smolinüs hypothesis by 
supposing that our universe is not typical, i.e. rejecting a Principle of Mediocrity.  
Hence, there is (at least at the moment) no possibility to falsify Smolinüs central 
claim that our universe is nearly optimal for black hole formation [cf. 75]. 
(One could introduce other ad hoc hypotheses as well in order to save Smolinüs 
central idea. But this might undermine its falsifiability, too. For example, if there 
are parameters whose variation from their actual value leads to an increase of 
black hole formation, one could still claim that these parameters cannot be varied 
without also changing other parameters, leading e.g. to large side-effects in star 
formation, hence the originally varied parameters are no independent parameters 
contrary to the assumption; cf. 3.1.1.)  
But note: if there is someday a Theory of Everything which uniquely determines 
the values of the physical parameters, the hypothesis of Cosmological Natural 
Selection would still be falsified at last.  
 
 
5.5 Some problems and possibilities 
 
Thus, Smolinüs account is daring and speculative but not a pure and untenable 
speculation. He made interesting predictions about our universeüs capability to 
form black holes which are or will be testable. It would be an important discovery 
if it turns out that our universe has indeed the property to produce an almost 
maximal number of black holes within a definite volume (or at least an almost 
 maximal number of black holes of a certain mass within a definite volume). This 
would be a fact which certainly needs an explanation. However, even if Smolin is 
right and every prediction of his hypothesis could be verified, Cosmological 
Natural Selection wouldnüt be confirmed è because there may be other explana-
tions for the optimal black hole formation rate or none at all. It is still a question 
of the truth of Smolinüs premises. And a maximal black hole formation rate of our 
universe cannot prove these premises.  
What else may count as a prove for Smolinüs premises then? Arenüt they unveri-
fiable and unfalsifiable in principle, not useful at all and hence just bad 
metaphysics in the tradition of medieval questions like asking for the highest 
possible number of angels on top of a needle? Not necessarily:  
· Because there is a è nowadays still very vague è theoretical framework that 
might describe the origin of new universes someday; Smolinüs premises might 
turn out as an implication of an otherwise well-established theory of quantum 
gravity in the future. 
· Because one could still argue that such a hypothesis functions as an explanation 
of a set of observational data and that the other universes are the unobservables 
that are postulated to explain these observed data by showing them to be necessary 
rather than a priori improbable; to complain that the other universes are them-
selves unobservable would be to confuse the logical role of the explanans with 
that of the explanandum; it is the explanandum that needs to be observed, not the 
explanans [cf. 53, p. 345]. One might stipulate on this line of reasoning the 
existence of very weird things however. Thus, we need additional clues and 
arguments to provide a reasonable theoretical background. 
· Because there might be observational effects of hypothetical connections 
between our universe and others (which might lead to a vanishing of the 
cosmological constant, for instance [8; 9]) or even traversable wormholes between 
them [70; 73]. But it would be indeed impossible to look at or into other 
universes, let alone to investigate the values of their fundamental parameters, if all 
effects and space-time tunnels are hidden behind event horizons of black holes.  
· Finally, one could argue for a naturalized version of the principle of plentitude è 
that is to claim that everything exists what is not explicitly forbidden by the laws 
of physics [51, p. 108; cf. 29, p. 395; 30, p. 111]. In particle physics, for example, 
every process is treated as possible as long it is not excluded by conservation prin-
ciples etc. However, this may only motivate the view that the assumption of other 
universes is not a priori meaningless. But it does not prove Smolinüs specific 
hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, Smolinüs premises might turn out to be philosophically useful even 
if they are beyond science: They may help to carve out the space of possibilities 
for example as an antidote against an uncritical belief in idealism, teleology or a 
Theory of Everything. This is probably irrelevant for science (and should be not 
confused with rigorous scientific methodology, of course); but it may still inspire 
philosophical reasoning. It is also a fascinating example for reflections of the pre-
suppositions and limitations of our intellectual and epistemological capabilities. 
And it is of cultural interest because it illustrates the power or influence of the 
new paradigm of self-organization which is compatible with an ontological 
reductionism without spooky metaphysical entities [66]. Last but not least, 
 Smolinüs hypothesis has an heuristical value, because it offers a new way of 
looking at the parameters of particle physics and cosmology. Compared with all 
the other proposals so far offered to explain the fundamental physical parameters, 
Smolinüs predictions (cf. 5.3) are the ones most vulnerable to falsification and 
hence well qualified for scientific testing. Therefore, they deserve further study. 
 
 
 
6 Metaphysics 
 
 
6.1 No refutation of the argument from design 
 
Smolinüs idea is an inspiring counterexample against the Argument from Design 
(also called the Teleological Argument) è the claim that the purposeful arrange-
ment and architecture of the (structure, laws and parameters of the) universe 
points to a teleological force or creator, for instance God. As in biology, self-
organized processes could lead to the emergence of complicated –teleonomicalé 
(i.e. functionally or teleologically described) structures out of much simpler ones. 
Thus, it is not a necessary truth that our universe has a divine origin. Recent trials 
to revitalize the infamous Argument from Design as a proof for God (or some 
other teleological force) with the help of the fine-tuning of the universe [10; 17; 
60; cf. also 32] are simply a non sequitur. The fact that we can interpret the 
universe as being designed, purposeful and meaningful does not imply that it 
actually was designed and has a purpose or meaning. 
Of course, this sceptical line of reasoning is not new [cf. 14, ch. 7.3; 28, p. 130]. 
But Smolin has presented a scenario which is more than hand waving 
speculations. However, it is still possible to claim that the Multiverse or the 
quantum vacuum or the natural laws are of divine origin. It is impossible to refute 
a sufficiently sophisticated claim of the existence of hidden forces, and not only 
within science è  but the burden of proof lies on the shoulder of its proponent 
anyway. Thus, Smolinüs scenario cannot and need not replace philosophical 
criticisms of the Teleological Argument, but may support them. 
 
 
6.2 No sufficient reason 
 
Smolinüs scenario cannot explain everything (nor does it want to, so this remark is 
not meant to criticize it but to stress an important limitation). Suppose, Smolin is 
right. Then we would know why the fundamental physical parameters are the way 
they actually are. They would be explained, or we would need no explanation 
anymore. 
However, this merely shifts the crucial question further back, because 
· we would still not know why the laws are the way they actually are è for in-
stance, why quantum gravity implies the birth of universes out of black holes and 
why quantum gravity is true at all, 
 · we would still not know how the first universe (the “mother of all universes–) 
came into being è or, if there is an infinite chain of universes, why there are 
universes at all.  
Thus, Smolinüs hypothesis does not give us a sufficient reason. Probably, a suffi-
cient reason cannot be given at all [cf. 72, ch. 6] ਂ  which is not to deny that it may 
play an important heuristic role in the development of science. But Cosmological 
Natural Selection is not a First Cause or a principle proven by itself. It cannot help 
us to overcome contingency. It cannot answer why there is anything at all (nor can 
the speculations about cosmic engineers). And it cannot explain why the physical 
laws are the way they are. In the ultimate sense, the cosmos remains a mystery.  
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